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DOES SOCRATES VINDICATE THE 
COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH? 
Within Plato's Socratic Dialogues we routinely observe the character of Socrates employing 
a formal, yet largely unexplained method of investigation into the beliefs that his 
interlocutors hold as true.  Socrates even goes so far as to claim there will be discord within 
them their whole life should they not be able refute one of his controversial and counter-
intuitive revealed truths.  With the beliefs under investigation striking to the core of how one 
should live a good life, this paper seeks to investigate whether Socrates' formal method 
justifies him in making the claims he does.  After exposing the methodology of his 
technique, we turn to investigate the theory of truth that the method represents, seeking to 
ascertain a greater understanding of what truth means to Socrates when he makes the claim 
that a belief is true. 
 
In the earlier works of Plato, more specifically what are often referred to as the Socratic 
dialogues, we regularly see an unusual but specific formal method of enquiry being 
undertaken.  Far from being mere backstory, this method is the pivotal process that the 
characters use to claim each other‟s beliefs are either true or false.  Claims as bold as these 
merit justification, some form of explanation as to how they can assert such things, a cogent 
theory that makes explicit how the process works; but we are to find little if any such 
justification, explanations, or reference to a theory within the dialogues.  If we wish to know 
more then, we must observe this method in use in an attempt to reveal its secrets.  I shall 
restrict the scope of this present enquiry to a selection of three of Plato‟s works from within 
the Socratic dialogues: Gorgias, Apology, and Crito
1
; which I will refer to as the examined 
dialogues.  Within these examined dialogues, the character Socrates
2
 is the most experienced 
practitioner of the method, we seem therefore more likely to learn the most about it through 
his skilled application.  The aim of this present work is then to investigate this method of 
enquiry further through Plato‟s character of Socrates as featured in the examined dialogues.  
What are the method‟s aims?  What roles do we see being occupied?  How is it supposed to 
work?  Are the characters actually justified in making such claims regarding truth and falsity?  
Finally, can we determine if there is a specific theory of truth that is being represented by this 
method? 
Background 
As the predominant figure associated with the use of this enigmatic method, it has for 
sometime been known simply as the Socratic method.  It is only recently, in fairly modern 
times
3
, that the method was baptized as the elenchus.  Plato does not directly name the 
activity himself, or provide any explicit instructions on what it is, or how it is supposed to 
work; he only describes it in the dialogues with terms meaning “to refute”, “to critically 
examine”, or “to censure”.  It is no surprise then that the language in the philosophical 
                                                 
1
 For the readers benefit I will prefix the Stephanus pagination references in the following format: Gor. for 
Gorgias, Apo. for Apology, and Cri. for Crito. 
2
 „Socrates‟ will in the scope of this work always refer to the Platonic character Socrates, and not the historical 
figure. 
3
 Vlastos (1994) comments we are unlikely to find uses prior to those of George Grote, 1865, and Lewis 
Campbell, 1867. 
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discourse concerning the elenchus often use the terms „examine‟ and „refute‟ interchangeably, 
but they obviously have quite different connotations.  I believe the more neutral „to examine 
critically by attempting refutation‟ best captures the general spirit of the elenchus, since it 
usually seems it is a process of investigation to discover truth, not prove it. 
The elenchus is a method that stands in direct contrast to the eristic style of argument, a 
commonplace approach or technique of the period.  The eristic technique has a simple credo: 
win the argument, that is all that matters.  This gives enormous latitude as to how one might 
achieve that goal, e.g. logical slight-of-hand by using known fallacious argument forms, the 
rhetorical arts to sway opinion, calls to unfounded majority beliefs, and even lying should it 
serve your purpose.  Whilst the eristic style is singular in its aim, it has multitude of ways of 
realizing that objective.  One might sum up the general strategy of the eristic approach with 
the slogan: „If it works, use it!‟ 
In contrast to the jousting, victory inspired nature of the eristic approach, we are told that the 
elenchus seeks something quite different: truth.  Socrates comments on this difference himself 
in Gorgias, “... they start trying to win the argument rather than look into the issue they set 
out to discuss.” (Plato 1994, Gor. 457d)  Unlike the ad hoc nature of the eristic approach, the 
elenchus always follows a specific format.  To say we have no instructions about the elenchus 
is not quite true, in locations across the examined dialogues we are informed by the characters 
of the single explicit instruction: you must represent your true position, your true beliefs.  The 
purpose of the elenchus is not to win, but to reveal by way of examination the truth of 
disputed premises.  Socrates tells us, “I’m certainly not less happy if I’m proved wrong than if 
I’ve proven someone else wrong, because, as I see it, I’ve got the best of it” (emphasis in 
original) (Plato 1994, Gor. 458a), making it quite clear that the greatest benefit is to be had by 
the „loser‟, the person who has their incorrect beliefs highlighted.  This approach is 
diametrically opposed to the outcomes of the eristic technique, since should you „lose‟ an 




We typically see Socrates inviting others to join him in an examination, as he does to the 
character Gorgias in the work Gorgias, “... if you were like me and saw the profit in being 
proved wrong, but that otherwise we should just forget it.” (Plato 1994, Gor. 461a); a clear 
indication that this is viewed as a shared voluntary investigation into the truth, but, only 
should that be of interest to you.  We also see Socrates allowing others to leave the 
examination should they wish to, as he does to Callicles, who faces „defeat‟ a little later in the 
same work, “But there’s no point in me saying all this unless you think we should finish the 
argument; if you don’t want to carry on, let’s leave it there and go home.” (Plato 1994, Gor. 
506a), an insight that if the person who was being examined was not open to accepting the 
conclusion of the enquiry, then it served little purpose to continue.  In the discourse on the 
dialogues, Socrates is often accused of being insincere with his „examinations‟, that he always 
knew where they would end up before he began, but his own position of “I certainly don’t 
speak as an expert with knowledge: I look into things with your help.” (Plato 1994, Gor. 506a) 
                                                 
4
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seems to at least suggest that is not how Socrates sees things.  Socrates is however renowned 
for having a complicated relationship surrounding claims to knowledge
5
.   
Elenchi
6
 may vary as to how many people are involved: in Crito we find only the character of 
the same name and Socrates performing an examination alone together at Socrates' prison 
cell, no more than a day or two before his death penalty is to be carried out; in Gorgias we see 
a small intimate group of mainly close friends taking turns in the key roles whilst they discuss 
what it is to live a good life; and in Apology we find Socrates facing capital charges before the 
entire assembly of the Athenian court; because it really wouldn‟t be unfair to say that all 
present are involved in some capacity, since they are all equally privy to the process and 
outcome of the examination should they wish to engage with it.  We find evidence to this 
passive involvement when Gorgias, who retired from an active role much earlier in an 
examination, gently scolds Callicles on behalf of this passive group for not answering 
Socrates‟ question, “Don’t do that, Callicles.  Please answer him.  We’d appreciate it too, 
because without your reply the discussion will be incomplete.” (Plato 1994, Gor. 497b)  We 
even see when Callicles notices the impending refutation of his own position approaching 
fast, and decides to withdraw, that again Gorgias on behalf of the passively involved 
„spectators‟ implores Socrates to finish the examination, even if he has to do so on his own, 
“I’d like you to complete the argument, and I get the impression everyone else wants you to as 
well.  In fact, for my part, I’d like to hear you round off the argument by yourself.” (Plato 
1994, Gor. 506b) 
Modus Operandi Exposed 
In an elenchus, there are usually two clearly defined roles: the examiner, and the examined
7
.  
In more complicated elenchi, it is quite usual to see the intermittent exchange of these roles 
shifting back and forth, a dynamic game of „cat and mouse‟ as both parties critically 
investigate the beliefs of the other.  From reviewing the examined dialogues we discover that 
the template for the basic form (BF) of a successful elenchus is expected to be as follows: 
BF1) Person X asserts proposition P 
BF2) Person Y believes P is false and targets for examination 
BF3) Y elicits further relevant propositions Q, R, S,... (as required) from within X‟s own 
beliefs 
BF4) Y argues that Q, R, S logically entail ~P 
BF5) X concedes Q, R, S do entail ~P 
BF6) Y declares P false and ~P true,  
BF7) It is now left up to X whether they attempt to resolve their inconsistent set of beliefs 
or not. 
                                                 
5
 See e.g. Vlastos (1994) chapter 2: Socrates‟ disavowal of knowledge 
6
 Elenchi: the plural form of elenchus 
7
 The term examined within the scope of this work shall apply to both single and multiple examinees. 
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Whilst a formal method, an elenchus might actually come about quite organically in an 
informal scenario, such as a dinner party between friends.  Let us then observe the elenchus in 
action in a hypothetical modern setting such as this, dealing with a contemporary issue as an 
introduction to the method.  John, the owner of a small business, (BF1) makes the claim (P) „I 
believe woman deserve equal pay‟.  Ex-employee Jane, who is sitting across the table from 
him, (BF2) believes P to be false; that whilst John may think he believes it, that in reality he 
does not, and seeks to refute it; not for her benefit, but for his.  At this point she takes on the 
role of the examiner, and in doing so, John becomes the examined assuming he agrees to the 
process, explicitly or tacitly.  Knowing John well, Jane (BF3) extracts the further relevant 
propositions from him: 
Q) A person who truly believes something operates in accordance with that belief 
R) A person who believes in something does not seek to engineer its contrary outcome 
S) John employs more women because he believes they work harder and he can hire them 
for less 
John agrees that these are truly his beliefs.  Jane, (BF4) argues that P is inconsistent with Q, 
R, S  since a person who truly believed P, women deserved equal pay, would: (Q) pay them 
equally, (R) not hire women because they are cheaper, and (S) would actually pay them more 
since they are believed to work harder. John, somewhat embarrassed, admits that whilst he 
was not overtly aware of his position, (BF5) concedes that Q, R, S do indeed entail ~P, that it 
now seems apparent it is not true that, „He believes that women deserve equal pay‟.  (BF6)  
Jane reiterates ~P is true, so those present have the opportunity to see how the examined set 
P, Q, R, S are logically inconsistent, giving them another opportunity to identify the same 
potential inconsistencies within themselves.  As a forgiving group of genuine friends, they 
talk further with John about the matter.  (BF7) John decides that he actually wants „I believe 
women deserve equal pay‟ as part of his logically consistent position.  As is his choice, he 
decides he would rather reject S than accept ~P as part of his consistent set, and resolves to 
begin moving towards parity in pay between his male and female workers. 
Some of the key elenctic points that we see in this hypothetical example are, KP1) that P is 
refuted from within the belief system of the examined person, KP2) once propositions Q, R, S 
have been elicited by the examiner and accepted by the examined, there is no further attempt 
to establish them as true, KP3) We only seem to find P guilty of belonging to an inconsistent 
premise set, yet, as a result it is claimed that P is false, and ~P is true. 
We can see that the key move in the elenchus being is made at BF3 by the examiner as they 
strive to extract a relevant proposition set of beliefs Q, R, S from the examined; it is this set 
that will seek to add their cumulative force to identify and expose the refutand
8
 as not 
consistent with that set.  We seem therefore to be seeing a method that originates from a 
theory that truth can be determined solely from within a set of beliefs, and that true beliefs 
will be non-exclusionary to other true beliefs, i.e. a true belief will not be excluded by the 
logical entailment of other true beliefs. 
                                                 
8
 Refutand: The proposition that is undergoing refutation, in this case P.  
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 on the methodology of the elenchus have all identified that its 
functionality is related to the concept of consistency within a set of beliefs, but I think there 
might be something more here.  I think what we are actually seeing in BF3 is more than 
merely a consistent set being extracted, or an even logically consistent set; we are seeing calls 
being made to a relevant set.  We have another more precise term for describing sets of things 
that are logically consistent, but, it also requires all members of the set to have a relationship 
to each other so that they fit well together; we describe sets meeting this additional criterion 
as coherent. 
The word „consistent‟ comes directly from the Latin10 consistent- „standing firm or still, 
existing‟; whereas the word „coherent‟ comes from the Latin cohaerere from co- „together‟ + 
haerere „to stick‟,  which culminates in „to stick together‟.  Whilst we commonly use coherent 
and logically consistent as interchangeable terms, it seems that these etymological definitions 
reveal their differing natures.  Coherence seems to be the stronger of the two terms, since a 
coherent system is logically consistent, but it also has the extra property of its members 
belonging to an integrated or interrelated system that fit together.  Consistency means only 
that group members do not logically contradict each other, there does not need to be any 
relationship between them. 
Set1) “Tasmania is an Island”  -  “Grass is green”  -  “Birds lay eggs” 
Set2) “Socrates is a man”  -  “All men are mortal”  - “To be mortal is to die”  
 
If we are asked are the members Set1 logically consistent, we will correctly answer yes, since 
none of the members logically exclude each other.  If asked is this a coherent group, we 
would say no; they are totally unrelated.  So whilst none of the members logically exclude 
one another, they also have no relevance or interrelationship with one another either, so don‟t 
obviously cohere as a set of just three beliefs; we would need to add more members to allow 
them to eventually cohere.  Set2 is both consistent, and coherent, since the members all 
integrate into one single interrelated form with no remainder, i.e. all the members of the set 
form a coherent comprehensible class. 
We can clearly see that consistency and coherence have different scopes from one another; 
the terms can serve more specific purposes than simply acting as synonyms if we will let 
them.  There is a reason that not just any belief is extracted at BF3, an extracted set that was 
logically consistent such as Set1, offers nothing of real value to the examiner or examined 
since they are unrelated.  It is specifically beliefs that are relevant and that will form a 
coherent foundation of entailment that are extracted; it is their coherence as a set that allows 
them to apply force to P.  I think what we are actually seeing in BF3 is the extraction of a set 
beliefs that are already taken to be true, but are a set of coherent beliefs. 
                                                 
9
 See e.g. Vlastos (1982;1994), and Waterfield from Plato (1994) 
10
 Latin definitions have been taken from Apple Inc., (2010) Snow Leopard (10.6.2) Dictionary v 2.1.1 
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Extracting Beliefs 
The most important role for the examiner is obviously the extraction of the relevant beliefs, so 
let us observe how Socrates himself approaches the core step of BF3.  We typically see 
Socrates steering a question and answer phase, with his interlocutor‟s responses being teased 
out and worked on from multiple angles as Socrates seeks to clearly expose their true 
position, their actual beliefs.  There is no real attempt in this phase to pin someone down; at 
any point his interlocutors are reasonably free to clarify, refine, and even redefine their 
position should they wish; as long as it is with the intention of more accurately expressing the 
beliefs they truly hold.  I wish to label the specific subsection of the BF3 process that begins 
with Socrates introducing a new theme, where it is refined, and ends when his interlocutor is 
offering their most refined representation of their belief relating to that theme, as its 
distillation: the interlocutor‟s opening position is refined down to its final belief form. We 
often find in the dialogues that a main elenctic enquiry breaks off into a series of other „child‟ 
elenchi that seek to affirm the truth of the beliefs that support their „parent‟ elenchi, which can 
result in quite complex hierarchical systems of examinations.   
Looking to an example in Apology (24c-25c within the encompassing section 24b-28b), we 
find ourselves in one of these child elenchi, so let us swiftly get to BF3 to see the beginning of 
the extraction.  As part of the charges he has brought against Socrates, (BF1) Meletus claims 
he holds the belief (P) „Socrates corrupts the young.‟  (BF2) Socrates obviously denies this 
and seeks to refute P.  Whilst there are, as is typical of Socrates‟ masterly use of the elenchus, 
multiple additional events happening here
11
, for clarity and brevity we will restrict our focus 
to how Socrates extracts just the first two members: Q and R; of the BF3 set in this scenario 
whilst overlooking all of his other sophisticated manoeuvres. 
The BF3 phase begins with Socrates enquiring, “If I corrupt, who makes them better?”  
Socrates quickly distills Meletus‟ initial answer from “the laws”, to an expanded cumulative 
position.   We follow the move from just the laws, outwards to include the judges, out wider 
to include all those present in court, and out further still to include every single Athenian.  
This distillation process results in Meletus‟ final position that, „everyone makes them better, 
but Socrates alone corrupts them‟. 
Socrates asks is the same true of horses; do the many make them better, and the one corrupt 
them?  Here we see Socrates apparently drawing an analogy between the making better of 
horses and the making better of young men.  This is a reference to Homer‟s Odyssey12, which 
is evidenced by the earlier
13
 reference in Gorgias where Socrates asks of Callicles, “Now, to 
be moral is to be tame, isn’t it? That’s what Homer says. What do you think?” (emphasis in 
original) (Plato 1994, Gor. 516c)  Socrates obviously agrees with Homer, as does Callicles 
                                                 
11
 Socrates is actually simultaneously developing multiple cases to show e.g. a) P is false b) Meletus does not 
even hold this belief c) Meletus is not the concerned citizen he is masquerading as and therefore offends the law 
since he has no interest in the matter d) Meletus was wrong to bring him to court in the first place; even if he was 
corrupting the young, Socrates claims it would have been necessarily unintentional (26a) and therefore he should 
have received admonishment or instruction neither of which Meletus afforded him. 
12
 Homer‟s Odyssey see e.g. book 6, line 120; book 9, line 175; book 13, line 201; and the usage of the phrase 
„wild and immoral‟. 
13
 Earlier from a narrative perspective, no claim about the author's chronological ordering of the written works is 
being made. 
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with his agreement, that to be wild is immoral, and to be tame is moral.  At Gorgias 516a/b, 
we see Socrates and Callicles establishing humans as creatures, and in this specific case, 
Socrates has been using horses as representations of creatures, developing further an 
analogous connection between humans and horses.  This reveals Socrates‟ move in Apology 
might not be just an ad hoc analogy, but is perhaps a deeper and directly relevant metaphor 
about the moral development of young men.  Socrates takes it as self-evidently true, and 
seems to assume that the assembly will agree with him that the opposite is actually the case; 
that it is the one, or the few (equestrians/moral trainers) that make the (horses/young men) 
better, and that the many who make them corrupt.  This seems a bold claim since it seems 
unlikely that every person or every horse would be corrupted by every person who was not a 
moral trainer or equestrian, but may be speaking more figuratively that if you are not helping 
someone to become more moral, then you are hindering them in their achievements.  
Regardless, Socrates appears to take this point of „the few and the many‟ as so evidently true, 
that even his „hostile‟ examinee, Meletus, will be unable to reject it.  So again we see what 
appears to be a call being made to a general truth, in this case, due the size of the assembly, a 
belief that the entire society would seem to have held as true. 
With this single distillation of Meletus‟ belief about who makes the people better, augmented 
by the appropriate selection of a relevant more general belief: it is the few, the specialists, that 
improve things, and it is the many who corrupt; we find that Socrates has begun to establish 
his extracted set from Meletus‟ beliefs. 
BF3-Q) [In the moral domain] Socrates is the few, all other Athenians are the many. 
BF3-R) [In the moral domain] It is the few make things better and the many who make 
them worse.   
Already we see a nascent cogency emerge in the interrelationship between Q and R.  This 
simple 2 member set is already exerting a logical force that, should they both be true, 
describes by logical entailment the beginning of a solid belief structure to refute P from; that 
Socrates in fact makes them better, or ~P. 
We seem to be observing that beliefs are not considered as able to be true within a vacuum, 
but only as true in a belief-to-belief justification as part of an interconnected network of 
beliefs.  The elenchus relies on what is logically entailed from the extracted premises, each 
additional relevant premise creates a more explicit coherent network of beliefs from which to 
more obviously show that P does not belong to such a set.  Since Q, R, S, are „logically 
unsecured‟ (Vlastos 1994), there is perhaps as we have seen from Socrates, a benefit to 
extract where possible, uncontentious generic beliefs that seem to be self-evidently true. 
Theories of Truth 
Having seen the form of the elenchus, and its use, we turn now to see if we can recognize any 
of its already identified properties within a wider theory of truth.  Since a theory is the set of 
principles on which the practice of an activity is based, and we are trying to discover the 
theory behind the elenchus, it makes sense to see if we can find any correlation with any of 
the contemporary theories of truth to further develop our understanding.  Theories of truth 
exist at a fundamental level within our ontologies; different theories logically entail and 
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describe very different metaphysical landscapes.  Such far reaching implications though, 
fortunately benefit us in our enquiry, since they are more likely to leave noticeable markers 
for us to recognize.  Putnam (1981) describes two contrasting philosophical points of view, or 
“philosophical temperaments” (p. 49), that he categorizes as the externalist perspective, what 
he calls the “God’s eye view” (Putnam 1981); and the internalist perspective, the “no eye 
view” (Putnam 1981); so let us first consider a theory of truth representative of an externalist 
perspective, the perspective of metaphysical realism. 
The predominant theory of truth has been the correspondence theory of truth, Putnam (1981) 
suggests the origin of this theory is attributed by ancient and medieval philosophers to Plato‟s 
student, Aristotle; but Schmitt (2004) suggests otherwise, that the correspondence theory‟s 
origins come from Plato‟s discussion of false beliefs within Sophist.  Putnam also comments, 
“Before Kant it is perhaps impossible to find any philosopher who did not have a 
correspondence theory of truth.” (emphasis in original) (1981)  The general position of the 
correspondence theory can be expressed in a simple slogan: a belief is true if it corresponds to 
a fact.  According to this theory, the simple proposition „Caesar is the fat cat that is siting on 
the mat‟, would be true iff there existed in the actual world at the time it was spoken a 
referenced mat, which was currently being sat upon by any such cat, which was indeed fat, 
that had been named Caesar.  Putnam (1981) tells us that the correspondence theory of truth is 
representative of the externalist perspective, the „God‟s eye view‟, since it is reliant on the 
view that there is a real existent world of some sort that is independent of our minds, and it 
this existent world that propositions correspond to that makes them true.  What makes a 
proposition true is that the configuration of a belief successfully refers by way of 
correspondence to a mirrored configuration that exists independent of mind, in the actual 
world; therefore, there is “exactly one true and complete description of ‘the way the world 
is’.” (Putnam 1981)  In this theory it is our metaphysics that explains the nature of truth, by 
providing the appropriately structured entities needed to enter into correspondence relations.  
This theory is then in essence “an ontological thesis: a belief is true if there exists an 
appropriate entity - a fact - to which it corresponds.  If there is no such entity, the belief is 
false.” (Glanzberg 2009, section 1.1.2)  There seems little obvious correlation between the 
elenchus and this theory, even at this most general of levels; we haven‟t noticed any obvious 
or repeated calls to facts or appropriately structured entities as justifiers of truth or true 
beliefs. 
Putnam (1981) then describes theories such as the coherence theories of truth as internalist 
perspectives, and representative of the „no eye view‟: “There is no God’s eye view that we can 
know or usefully imagine; there are only the various points of view of actual persons 
reflecting various interests and purposes that their descriptions and theories subserve.” 
(Putnam 1981) Some of the coherence theories of truth can similarly be captured in a slogan: 
a belief is true if part of a coherent system of beliefs.  These theories state “that a proposition 
is true if it is the content of a belief in the system, or entailed by a belief in the system.” 
(Glanzberg 2009, section 1.3)  Coherence theories differ from correspondence in that instead 
of truth being a matter of whether there exists suitably configured objects in the world to 
mirror their respective propositions, truth is a matter of how beliefs are related to each other.  
Whilst the correspondence theory seeks to represent the common intuition that truth is a 
belief-to-world relationship, coherence theorists argue that truth is a belief-to-belief 
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relationship; that truth is “some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with 
our experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our belief system” 
(emphasis in original) (Putnam 1981)  Putnam also suggests that in contrast to the 
correspondence theories „one true way‟ the world is, that, “Many ‘internalist’ philosophers, 
though not all, hold ... that there is more than one ‘true’ theory or description of the world.” 
(Putnam 1981)  For clarity in later discussion, and since the ideas presented so far have been a 
very generic overview of many different approaches to coherence theories, I will refer to 
these ideas as a common coherence theory (CCT), since they do not represent any one theory, 
just the common ground between many approaches. 
Immediately we can see that these types of coherence theory bear a striking resemblance to 
what we are observing within the elenchus; we see an attempt to judge the refutand solely on 
its ability to cohere with the set of beliefs extracted from the belief system of the examined.  
We also observe in the elenchus that the refutand would be claimed to be proven true if the 
examiner was unable to extract a set to exclude it, and certainly found false should the logical 
entailment of the extracted set exclude it as incoherent.  If we are indeed looking at the 
elenchus as having some form of relationship to the coherence theories, then it looks as if 
Putnam might be mistaken, and we might be seeing some form of coherence theory, or 
application of it, in Plato‟s character Socrates some two millennia prior to Kant.  Let us look 
closer at coherence theories then, to see if we are in the right kind of area for a theory that 
might explain or represent what is going on in an elenchus, and whether we have actually 
made such a discovery. 
Let us consider an alternative coherence theory of truth to the CCT, still an internalist 
perspective, but one that represents idealism's approach to truth.  Materialism argues that the 
body and mind are composed of just one substance, matter; that all mental phenomena can be 
accounted for just in terms of physical matter, and therefore dualism is false.  Dualism argues 
that this is not the case, that there must be something more than just matter because we are 
unable to account for all of our mental mental nature in purely material terms, and therefore 
argue that materialism is false.  Idealism is also a monist position like materialism, and agrees 
with it that material and mental nature should be understood in the same terms; but, instead of 
seeking to understand mental nature in terms of material nature, they seek to understand 
material nature in terms of mental nature.  They agree with materialism in rejecting dualism, 
but, “differ about where to find the ultimate ingredients.” (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 
2007)  Joachim (1906) offers a representation of British Idealism‟s approach to a coherence 
theory of truth: „Truth in its essential nature is that systematic coherence which is the 
character of a significant whole.‟ (Joachim 1906)  For Joachim truth is singular, only the 
„significant whole‟ is true; no individual belief, or subset of beliefs are true, it is only the 
totality of all accurate beliefs that constitute the „significant whole‟; anything less than the 
complete system can only ever be true by degree, never more than a partial truth.  We do not 
see any obvious language referring to „the Truth‟ as the significant whole in the examined 
dialogues: things are either successfully refuted and claimed to be false, unable to be refuted 
and taken to be true
14
, or an impasse is reached which results in an unsuccessful examination.  
                                                 
14
 For the time being at least, there is no double jeopardy defense in the elenchus, any belief might be examined 
repeatedly 
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We would hope to see more obvious language referring to partial truths or truth by degree 
manifested by its adherents; however, we do see truth being refined, attempts to make truth 
„more true‟ by revisiting it to test it further, so we should not discount this approach just yet. 
We see in Joachim‟s representation of British Idealism‟s coherence theory, reference to a 
„significant whole‟, a singular significant set of beliefs that is considered to be The Truth.  
Similarly, we find references being made to significant sets in CCT, but, as we saw earlier, 
they are a little more „moderate‟ in that they allow for individual beliefs from within the 
significant set to be true, „if it is the content of a belief in the system, or entailed by a belief in 
the system’.  For some coherence theorists, such as Young15, this significant set is the largest 
consistent set of propositions that is currently believed by actual people; others like 
Davidson
16
 suggest it is the set which would be recognized as true by an omniscient observer; 
whilst others such as Putnam (1981) hold that the significant set is the set that will be held to 
be true by people like us with finite cognitive capacities when we have reached some limit of 
enquiry. 
Young tells us, “According to some early versions of the coherence theory, the coherence 
relation is simply consistency.” (2008, see section 1)  However, since it is possible for two 
inconsistent propositions to both be consistent with a specified set, yet inconsistent together, 
consistency alone cannot accurately capture the coherence relation.  Young then goes on to 
comment, “A more plausible version of the coherence theory states that the coherence 
relation is some form of entailment.” (2008, see section 1)  We certainly see evidence of 
entailment being featured within the elenchus.  The refutand is considered proven false if the 
content and relationship between the extracted set entails ~P.  Bradley
17
 has also suggested 
that coherence is the mutual explanatory support between premises, but this does not seem to 
be such an obvious correlation with what we see in the elenchus as does the relation of 
entailment.  It seems that the theory behind the elenchus may be a coherence theory of truth 
that considers entailment to be the coherence relation. 
A Tool for Truth? 
Knowing what little we have learnt so far, let‟s see if Socrates has any sort of justification for 
even making claims of revealing truth and falsity in beliefs.  Even when Socrates claims to 
have revealed the truth, he still invites people to prove him wrong
18
, and this generally seems 
to be a genuine invitation.  Here we appear to see a inconsistent position, because it seems 
that Socrates‟ 'truth' is always open to review and amendment in light of new information.  He 
appears therefore to not be stating that this is an absolute truth; but, that this is a correctable 
truth.  One might also infer from the lack of instructions Plato provided for the elenchus, that 
he thought its use could be picked up just through observation, that it was self-apparent how it 
worked.  If intended to be a tool for widespread adoption by the populace, it highlights the 
                                                 
15
 See e.g. Young, J.O., (2001). A Defence of the Coherence Theory of Truth. The Journal of Philosophical 
Research, 26: 89-101. 
16
 In his earlier works at least. (Malpas, 2009, see section 4.2)  See e.g. Davidson, D., (1986). A Coherence 
Theory of Truth and Knowledge, In E. LePore (Ed.), Truth And Interpretation, Perspectives on the Philosophy 
of Donald Davidson,  Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
17
 See e.g. Bradley, F., (1914). Essays on Truth and Reality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.; or, Thagard. P., (1989) 
Explanatory coherence. Behavioural and Brain Sciences. 12, 435-467. 
18
 e.g. Callicles (Gor. 482b) who rejects Socrates claim to have proven his thesis, is invited to prove him wrong. 
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issue that a skilled examiner such as Socrates with his ability to extract beliefs and create 
logical entailments might put a novice in the elenctic method at a distinct disadvantage in 
„defending‟ the truth, even if the novice‟s belief was actually true.  Alternatively, should an 
examiner have an eristic bent, they might easily find ways to obscure the truth, intentionally 
undermining the value and integrity of the tool.  Also, should you have a seriously flawed 
belief system to start out with, inexperienced use may end up having the inverse effect and 
actually further corrupt your own currently minimally coherent set. It is therefore a fallible 
system, and part of that comes from its dependence on the skill level and intentionality of the 
operators.  Socrates himself points out that the operators need to possess three qualities: 
knowledge, affection, and candour; that you need these to have the “complete set” (Plato 
1994, Gor. 487a).  Socrates tell us that, “... for anyone to be able to test whether or not a 
person’s life is as it should be ...” (Plato 1994, Gor. 486e) they have to have the complete set.  
This confirms the method is not expected to yield the same results for all its users, which 
instantly disqualifies it from being a tool for absolute truth, but places it more in the category 
of an operator dependent truth indicator. 
I feel though that when Socrates makes reference to having the qualities to, “... to be able to 
test whether or not a person’s life is as it should be ...” (Plato 1994, Gor. 486e), we are not 
seeing an abstract reference to some ultimate test of a life, it seems clear he is talking directly 
about the method of testing they are currently engaged in, the elenchus.  This would indicate 
that the elenchus is not a tool for absolute truth, as its practitioners seem to be claiming 
through their language use, but in fact a tool for examining a life through the coherence of 
their belief system; seeking to make corrections where it finds discrepancies through bringing 
them into conscious awareness for review. 
In Gorgias, as Polus retires from the examined role, there is a contentious belief that Socrates 
has „proven‟ via the elenchus which Callicles is unwilling to accept.  Socrates has been asking 
those assembled to disprove his thesis that “wrongdoing - particularly unpunished 
wrongdoing - is not the absolutely worst thing that can happen”19 (Plato 1997, Gor. 482b).  
Callicles is told that if he can not refute Socrates‟ contentious claim, and not integrate this 
'truth' into his belief system, that “Callicles: there’ll be discord within you your whole life.” 
(Plato 1994, Gor. 482b) due to the now known inconsistency in his belief set.  This is a very 
personal focus, which Socrates then expands on, with the explanation that it is better for a 
person to be a choir leader with a cacophonous choir, than it is for just one person - me - to 
contradict and clash with myself. (Gor. 482b/c)  This seems to read that your primary concern 
should be coherency on a personal level, that your own internal belief set need not necessarily 
conform to any other belief set, just as long as it is internally coherent.  We have also seen no 
obvious references to significant sets. The theory behind the elenchus is then potentially a 
„primitive‟ form of personal coherence theory, perhaps even a relativistic form of coherence 
theory.  Socrates may well have expected the commonality of self-evident truths to generally 
move people towards a general set of truth, an external significant set, but he appears to 
intentionally restrict his focus to an individual‟s internal coherence first. 
                                                 
19
 i.e. Plato is claiming our own unpunished wrongdoing is the worst thing that can happen for us personally. 
Warren Deane „Does Socrates Vindicate the Coherence Theory of Truth?‟ 
 
Emergent Australasian Philosophers Issue 4, 2011 12 
 
We see this personal focus again from Socrates too in the closing lines of Gorgias, which also 
confirms the real purpose of the elenchus.  “Argument after argument can be proved wrong, 
but just one holds its ground - that we have to take greater care to avoid doing wrong than we 
do to avoid suffering wrong, and that above all else we must concentrate not on making 
people believe that we’re good, but on being good, in our private lives as well as our public.” 
(Plato, 1994, Gor. 527b).  Socrates invites us to join him, on his journey for personal moral 
improvement, his unrelenting desire, to help us to be better versions of ourselves.  Socrates 
tells us that it is only when we have completed our training, through the examination of our 
lives and bringing them into a coherent position, that we are we truly fit to act as contributors 
to society (Gor. 527d).  We have a series of works from Plato, all featuring the common 
theme, what is it to live a good life.  We are shown a tool in the elenchus that is at its core, 
and explicitly referenced as such by Socrates himself, a tool for self-improvement.  
Something to be shared ideally between those with compassion for one another, a reasonable 
amount of knowledge, and with the candour to speak their mind about their real beliefs, and 
point out the errors in their friend's positions. 
Conclusions 
The elenchus is not then as I have shown, the tool for finding truth that we might have 
thought it was prima facie.  It primarily seems to be a coherence maintenance and 
improvement tool, a device to build a robust belief platform from which to apply leverage to 
extract false beliefs and their root systems.  It is a tool of self improvement, intended to make 
us who we should be, before we seriously entertain the idea of entering public life and 
affecting change.  The elenchus is perhaps then the embodiment of the famous Socratean 
slogan „The unexamined life is not worth living‟; intended to be a simple tool to allow 
gatherings of people
20
 to engage in meaningful discussion and perform an examination of 
their lives.  It provides a formal process of a rational dialogue between contrasting positions, a 
method to bridge the divide between entrenched opposing views, and find and explore the 
commonalities between them.  As seen in the dinner party example, it can bring about 
positive change, it can reveal inconsistencies in our belief systems, so it has a practical 
purpose; it just needs to be understood that this is only an indicator of truth, that it only 
provides correctable truths. 
I think the elenchus still has incredible value though, we just need to be careful about how we 
phrase and regard the outcomes of examinations.  Correctable truths, or more accurate truths 
still have a value to us.  It is hard to find any fault with an aim to move from a less coherent to 
a more coherent set of beliefs.  I do believe that we are looking at a method originating from a 
nascent coherence theory of truth.  The elenchus has features that represent some of the core 
strands we see in contemporary coherence theories of truth: entailment, belief-to-belief 
relationships, truth being judged from within a network of beliefs; this method bears all the 
hallmarks of a coherence theory.  It may not completely capture the nature of truth, but that is 
perhaps not its intended goal.  The elenchus does not seem to offer a perfect coherence theory 
that answers all our questions about truth and its nature, it is therefore not the theory to 
vindicate coherence theorists of claims of being fundamentally mistaken in their position; but, 
                                                 
20
 Possibly ideally smaller groups, but not necessarily so as we have seen in Apology, so that each person present 
can take part in the examination to the full extent of their interest level. 
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I think it definitely offers us the ability to recognize just enough of the nature of truth, to 
provide us with some real value in our lives.  Via the character of Socrates, Plato is claiming 
that we need to focus on our moral development, but he seems to understand that it will be an 
incremental process, and is content for us to move forward one truth at a time.  In the 
elenchus then, he has provided us with a tool, that should we choose to use it, will move us 
gently and manageably towards a more moral, consistent, coherent, rational set of beliefs.  He 
has given us a tool to help tame ourselves, and those we care most about. 
 
University of Waikato 
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